Twenty Lectures On Algorithmic Game Theory

Author: Tim Roughgarden
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107172667
Size: 72.86 MB
Format: PDF, Mobi
View: 5312
Download Read Online
This accessible introduction features case studies in online advertising, spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

Algorithmic Game Theory

Author: Burkhard Monien
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540793089
Size: 16.32 MB
Format: PDF, Kindle
View: 7430
Download Read Online
In this paper we consider the influence of link restrictions on the price of anarchy
for several social cost functions in the following model of selfish routing. Each of n
players in a network game seeks to send a message with a certain length by
choosing one of m parallel links. Each player is restricted to transmit over a
certain subset of links and desires to minimize his own transmission-time (latency
). We study Nash equilibria of the game, in which no player can decrease his
latency by ...

Internet And Network Economics

Author: Xiaotie Deng
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9783540309000
Size: 28.91 MB
Format: PDF, Mobi
View: 7396
Download Read Online
The philosophy is the same as the term “price of anarchy” which was firstly
introduced to congestion games and selfish routing in networks ([9], [11]). Earlier
studies on the inefficiency properties of oligopoly or monopoly focused mainly on
empirical analysis (e.g. [6], [4]), while recent papers began to quantify the
inefficiency. Anderson and Renault [1] parameterized the curvature of market
demand, and derived bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer
surplus to producer ...

Combinatorial And Algorithmic Aspects Of Networking

Author: Thomas Erlebach
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540488227
Size: 31.20 MB
Format: PDF, ePub, Docs
View: 3201
Download Read Online
We study the price of anarchy for selfish multicast routing nes in directed
multigraphs with latency functions on the edges, ex- ding the known theory for the
unicast situation, and exhibiting new snomena not present in the unicast model.
In the multicast model we re N commodities (or player classes), where for each i
= 1,. . . , N, a v from a source s, to a finite number of terminals t } , . . . , has to be
ited such that every terminal t\ receives flow rii £ M>o- One of the significant
results of this ...

Current Trends In Theoretical Computer Science

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN: 9814483052
Size: 78.64 MB
Format: PDF, ePub, Docs
View: 4960
Download Read Online
The initial questions have been successfully answered but many more problems
remain open. I mentioned some of them above but there are many more. For
example, the price of anarchy and more generally coordination mechanisms for
objectives other than the makespan, such as (weighted) average completion time
, have not been studied yet. Finally, the notion of coordination mechanism can be
extended to selfish routing and other generalizations of congestion games [7].

Current Trends In Theoretical Computer Science

Author: Gheorghe Paeaun
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812387838
Size: 43.25 MB
Format: PDF, ePub, Docs
View: 6499
Download Read Online
I mentioned some of them above but there are many more. For example, the price
of anarchy and more generally coordination mechanisms for objectives other
than the makespan, such as (weighted) average completion time, have not been
studied yet. Finally, the notion of coordination mechanism can be extended to
selfish routing and other generalizations of congestion games [7]. In particular,
coordination mechanisms raise intriguing new questions for the selfish routing
model of ...

Current Trends In Theoretical Computer Science

Author: Gheorghe P?un
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9789812389664
Size: 11.81 MB
Format: PDF, ePub, Mobi
View: 6792
Download Read Online
I mentioned some of them above but there are many more. For example, the price
of anarchy and more generally coordination mechanisms for objectives other
than the makespan, such as (weighted) average completion time, have not been
studied yet. Finally, the notion of coordination mechanism can be extended to
selfish routing and other generalizations of congestion games [7]. In particular,
coordination mechanisms raise intriguing new questions for the selfish routing
model of ...

Automata Languages And Programming

Author: Javier Esparza
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3662439484
Size: 44.20 MB
Format: PDF, Kindle
View: 6037
Download Read Online
While selfish routing has been studied extensively, the problem of designing
better coordination mechanisms for routing over time in general graphs has
remained an open problem. In this paper, we focus on tree networks (single
source multiple destinations) with the goal of minimizing (weighted) average
sojourn time of jobs, and provide the first coordination mechanisms with provable
price of anarchy for this problem. Interestingly, we achieve our price of anarchy
results using simple ...

Issues In Computer Science And Theory 2013 Edition

Author:
Publisher: ScholarlyEditions
ISBN: 1490109056
Size: 33.34 MB
Format: PDF, ePub, Docs
View: 3336
Download Read Online
Other than bounding the price of anarchy of selfish routing games (Roughgarden
and Tardos, 2002 [25], Awerbuch et al. 2005 [2], Christodoulou and Koutsoupias,
2005 [9]), there are many interesting problems about game dynamics in these
games. It is known that exponentially long best-response walks may exist to pure
Nash equilibria (Fabrikant et al. 2004 [12]), and random best-response walks
converge to solutions with good approximation guarantees after polynomially
many ...